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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic investment game in which firms that are initially identical
develop assets which are specialized to different market segments. The model assumes
there are increasing returns to investment in a segment, for example, due to word-of-
mouth or learning curve effects. I derive three key results: (1) Under certain conditions
there is a unique equilibrium in which firms that are only slightly different focus all of
their investment in different segments, causing small random differences to expand into
large permanent differences. (2) On the other hand, if firms are sufficiently patient or
if sufficiently large random shocks are possible, there is always an equilibrium in which
the firm focused on the smaller segment changes its strategy, attacking its rival until it
drives the rival out of the larger segment. (3) Surprisingly, a firm might sometimes want
to reduce its own assets in a segment in order to entice its competitor to shift focus to
this segment.
∗I am grateful to my advisor, Birger Wernerfelt, for his support and guidance. Helpful comments were
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1 Introduction
Casual observation reveals that even firms in the same industry are different from each
other. Each firm has unique assets such as its reputation, relationships, and production skills
(Wernerfelt 1984; Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Teece et al. 1997; Dutta et al. 1999). Standard
models of product design such as the Hotelling model imply that firms should differentiate to
soften price competition (D’Aspremont et al. 1979). However, such models do not answer two
important questions: What initially determines which customer segment each firm serves? And
once firms start serving different segments, under what conditions will those differences persist
over time, and under what conditions will firms eventually switch back-and-forth between
different segments?
This paper develops a dynamic investment game that proposes answers to these questions.
The model assumes that two competing firms each allocate investment across two customer
segments of unequal size, and that there are increasing returns to investment in a segment, for
example, due to word-of-mouth effects (Rob and Fishman 2005) or learning curves (Argote and
Epple 1990). Small early differences arise between the the firms due to “random shocks” such
as differences in founders’ previous experiences or fortuitous discoveries of better production
processes. I derive three key results, which are described in the three subsections of this
introduction.
1.1 Conditions in which random shocks lead to permanent differences
I show that permanent differences are guaranteed to arise, with early random shocks determin-
ing where each firm ends up focusing its investment, if the following three conditions hold: (1)
preemption effects are neither too weak nor too strong;1 (2) the largest possible random shock
is neither too small nor too large; and (3) firms are not too patient. When these conditions
hold, the model does not depend (as many models of product design do) on an arbitrary
selection among various possible equilibria to determine where each firm allocates investment.
1Preemption effects are defined as the extent to which an increase in one firm’s assets in a segment makes
it less profitable for the other firm to increase its assets in that same segment.
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Rather, a rational firm must always follow the optimal path determined by its previous history.
One implication of this result is that small random events early in the life of a company
can determine its eventual area of expertise. For example, because Ben and Jerry’s co-founder
Ben Cohen had sinus problems that make it hard for him to taste normal ice cream flavors, he
liked to add texture to some of their homemade ice cream shop’s flavors by including very large
chunks of chocolate, cookies, or other “mix-ins” (Lager 1994; Dreifus 1994).2 To the surprise of
the founders, ice cream with large chunks turned out to be extremely popular with customers,
so they starting packaging it into pint containers to sell in local grocery stores. Over the
next five year they continuously modified the machines that dispensed their ice cream to help
prevent the chunks from getting stuck and also experimented with different cookie dough mixes
until they found one that would not clog the machinery. Partly as a result of this production
expertise they developed, they eventually became the dominant producer of chunky ice cream
flavors (Lager 1994; Collis and Conrad 2005).
Dell Computer is another example of a company that focused on an area of early, arguably
random, success. Because college student Michael Dell only had $1,000 in capital when he
started assembling and selling personal computers from his college dorm room, he could not
maintain a large stock of inventory; instead, he and three employees custom assembled a
computer for each order and then shipped it directly to the customer (Dell 1999). As the
company grew, they “forced all of our people to focus 100 percent” on this build-to-order
model by not selling through retailers, which helped Dell achieved a cost advantage through
fast inventory turnover rates (Dell 1999).3
Thus, Ben and Jerry’s initially created ice cream with large chunks due to Ben Cohen’s sinus
problems, and Dell initially learned to custom assemble computers due to a lack of funding.
The model in this paper implies that increasing returns, for example, due to word-of-mouth
2Like other homemade ice cream shops, Ben and Jerry’s initially sold both chunky ice cream flavors and
traditional “smooth” flavors. Their key product innovation was to use bigger chunks (Lager 1994).
3As competition from manufacturing plants in China has eroded Dell’s cost advantage, Dell has begun
selling through retail stores and is reorganizing its supply chain to move away from the direct model (Shah
2008). We can think of the rise of computer manufacturing in China as an extremely unfavorable shock to
Dell’s core area of expertise. Consistent with the model in this paper, Dell has totally shifted its investment
to developing a new area of expertise.
3
effects, learning curves, and the need for sets of complementary assets devoted to a particular
segment, compelled each firm to invest in this area of early good fortune until it became an
important source of competitive advantage for the firm.
1.2 Conditions in which major strategic changes can occur
On the other hand, I also show that, if sufficiently large random shocks can occur or if firms
are sufficiently patient, then it is possible for firms to make major strategic changes, totally
shifting focus from one segment to another. For example, Sony successfully drove Nintendo
out of the segment of hard-core video game players partly because a large shock occurred due
to the invention of CD-ROMs, an efficient information storage technology in which Sony had
expertise and which they used in their PlayStation video game system (Edge 2009); and partly
because Sony was patient enough to continue investing in the PlayStation for over a decade
until Nintendo decided to stop competing for this segment and to pursue more casual gamers
with its Wii system (Mossberg and Boehret 2006; Edge 2009). Thus, the model provides
insight into factors that helped make this strategic attack successful.4
1.3 A firm can benefit from its own failure or its competitor’s success
Finally, I show that a firm can benefit from its competitor’s success or its own failure in a
segment. For example, former Ben and Jerry’s CEO Fred Lager speculated that their main
competitor, Ha¨agen-Dazs, did not invest in the modifications to production equipment needed
to produce chunky flavors because Ha¨agen-Dazs wanted to avoid distractions from their already
successful business selling smooth flavors and was concerned that taking time to invest in
chunky flavors would make their production process for smooth flavors less efficient (Lager
1994, p. 140). Thus, Ben and Jerry’s arguably benefited from Ha¨agen-Dazs’ strength in
4It is interesting that both firms in this example are Japanese, as it is commonly believed that Japanese
firms are more patient than American ones (e.g., Maskin 1995). The model in this paper predicts that patient
firms are more likely to launch strategic attacks and are also more likely to shift their focus to a new area in
response to an attack.
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smooth flavors.5
The first two key results, which state conditions in which this model leads to either
permanent differences or major strategic changes, are consistent with what we would expect
given the model set-up. The main point of these results is to propose a new explanation for
how firms develop (and potentially change) their marketing strategies, and to derive precise
conditions in which this explanation holds. On the other hand, the result that a firm can benefit
from its competitor’s success or its own failure is more surprising, and directly contradicts
previous theoretical results from dynamic investment games in which firms compete along a
single dimension (Ericson and Pakes 1995); thus, this paper demonstrates an important new
implication of allowing dynamic competition along multiple dimensions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section
3 presents the model set-up. Section 4 derives conditions that guarantee permanent differences
arise. Section 5 derives conditions in which major strategic changes are always possible. Section
6 presents an extension in which each firm can destroy some of its assets. Section 7 concludes.
Appendix A contains all proofs.
2 Related Literature
Product design models such as the Hotelling model imply that firms become different to soften
price competition (e.g., D’Aspremont et al. 1979; Shaked and Sutton 1982; Goettler and
Shachar 2001; Desai, Kekre, Radhakrishnan, and Srinivasan 2001; Orhun 2005; Shin 2007;
Thomadsen 2007; Zhu and Singh 2009; Subramaniam and Gal-Or 2009). However, because
these models are static, they are not well-suited to study whether each firm stays focused
on a single segment or switches back-and-forth between segments, which is the key question
studied in the current dynamic model. Furthermore, most previous product design models
have multiple equilibria in which either firm could win a particular segment; by contrast, the
5Another possible explanation is that Ha¨agen-Dazs did not realize how popular chunky flavors would become.
However, from very early on Ha¨agen-Dazs tried to pressure distributors not to carry Ben and Jerry’s ice cream,
suggesting that Ha¨agen-Dazs did in fact realize chunky flavors could potentially appeal to a large customer
segment (Lager 1994, p. 106).
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current paper derives conditions in which there is a unique equilibrium with random shocks
determining which segment each firm wins.
Some models predict that the first entrant will end up with the more attractive location
(Prescott and Visscher 1977; Moorthy 1988) or with more assets (Sutton 1991).6 However,
while there is some empirical evidence for first-mover advantages (Urban et al. 1986), in many
cases the most successful firm in a market was not the first entrant, suggesting that factors other
than order-of-entry must play a role in determining firm performance (Golder and Tellis 1993).
The current paper provides one possible explanation for such factors, showing how random
historical events, along with firms’ investment allocation decisions, can determine each firm’s
eventual area of expertise.
Previous models of dynamic investment games have also shown how random fluctuations
can lead to differences in firms’ asset levels (Budd et al. 1993; Villas-Boas 1993; Athey and
Schmutzler 2001; Besanko and Doraszelski 2004; Ho¨rner 2004). However, these earlier dynamic
models assume each firm invests in a single type of asset. By contrast, the current paper allows
for investment in two assets, which leads to the new result that a firm can sometimes benefit
from reducing its own assets in a segment to entice its competitor to switch focus to this
segment.
Another important limitation of previous dynamic investment games is that, to deal with
the problem of multiple equilibria, they typically assume firms follow strategies that are Markov
(so a firm’s investment is a function only of current asset levels) and stationary (so investment
functions do not change over time). However, in reality firms can and do change their strategies
for reasons that are not just based on changes in their assets. For example, a firm that is
currently focusing on a niche customer segment might hire a new chief executive officer who
simply decides to adopt the more aggressive strategy of attacking the mainstream segment. To
allow for such changes in strategy that are not related to underlying assets, the current paper
does not restrict firms to Markov perfect equilibria, but instead uses the more general concept
of subgame perfect equilibrium. This leads to the new result that, under some conditions,
6Other theoretical research has explored why later movers might have an advantage (e.g., Chen and Xie
2007).
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regardless of the history of the game, there is an equilibrium in which the less profitable firm
launches a successful attack and eventually becomes more profitable than its rival.
My model bears some resemblance to the model by Levinthal (1997) in which firms search
across a “rugged landscape” for an optimal organizational form. One major difference is that in
this earlier model each firm tries to optimize its own fitness, without regard for how its decisions
will affect subsequent decisions by rivals. By contrast, the current paper uses a game-theoretic
approach in which each firm accounts for potential competitive reactions, which allows for the
possibility of strategic attacks that attempt to drive a rival out of the segment.
Other papers attribute differences among firms to their inability to optimize, for example,
due to principal-agent problems (Gibbons 2006; Ellison and Holden 2008) or boundedly rational
managers (Barney 1986; Goldfarb and Xiao 2009). By contrast, the current paper shows that,
even if firms behave optimally, differences in firms’ investment incentives can lead to persistent
differences in their performance along various dimensions.
3 Model Set-up
Assume firms i and j compete in two segments, possibly of different sizes. For each time
t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, let Mi,t and Ni,t denote firm i’s assets devoted to the mainstream and niche
segment, respectively, and let mi,t and ni,t denote its investment in these segments.
Firm i’s profits in the mainstream segment in period t are:
pii,M,t = F (Mi,t)−G(Mj,t)− ψMi,tMj,t − Cmi,t (1)
Its profits in the niche segment are:
pii,N,t = α
[
F (Ni,t)−G(Nj,t)− ψNi,tNj,t
]
− Cni,t (2)
where F ′ > 0, F ′′ > 0, G′ > 0, α ∈ [0, 1], ψ ≥ 0. The second derivative of G can be either
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positive or negative, but we do need G′′ ≥ −ψ.7 The parameter C is a scaling factor that
represents the unit cost of investment. Firm j’s profit functions are the same as those of Firm
i, except with the firm indexes reversed.8
Note that the model assumes increasing returns to a firm’s own assets in a segment (F ′′ > 0).
There are many possible sources of increasing returns, including demand-side effects, such
as word-of-mouth incentives (Rob and Fishman 2005), reputation effects (Kreps and Wilson
1982), and network effects (Arthur 1989); as well as supply-side effects, such as division of
labor benefits (Smith 1776) and learning curves (Argote and Epple 1990). More generally,
having an existing set of assets devoted to a segment often makes it easier or more valuable for
a firm to acquire additional assets devoted to this segment. For example, if a firm is already
good at designing products that appeal to a particular type of customer, it makes sense for
this firm to invest in the production skills needed to satisfy this customer segment’s needs,
and to invest in distribution agreements that enable them to reach this segment. Such asset
complementarity can generate increasing returns to a firm’s overall level of assets devoted to a
particular segment. All of my results would also hold for S-shaped (increasing-then-decreasing)
returns as long as marginal returns do not decrease to the point that firms wants to diversify.9
The negative interaction terms −ψMi,tMj,t and −ψNi,tNj,t imply that it is more profitable
for a firm to invest in a segment where its competitor is weak. The parameter ψ represents
the strength of these preemption effects. For example, ψ will tend to be high if consumers’
search costs are low (Kuksov 2004), or if firms are very similar on dimensions other than the
ones represented by the assets in which firms are investing (Bronnenberg 2008).
Both firms start at time t = 0 with zero assets in each segment, and assets evolve as follows:
Mi,t = γMi,t−1 +mi,t + m,i,t (3)
7This restriction on the second-derivative of G ensures that a firm that is leading in the mainstream segment
and trailing in the niche segment would prefer its competitor to focus in the niche segment; this condition is
needed for the result about asset destruction in section 6.
8A supplemental appendix available on the author’s website (Supplemental Appendix B) presents an example
of a model of competition that is consistent with these profit functions.
9A supplemental appendix available on the author’s website (Supplemental Appendix C) discusses this and
other reasons for diversification.
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Ni,t = γNi,t−1 + ni,t + n,i,t (4)
The term γ ∈ [0, 1) reflects depreciation of assets, for example, due to employees leaving the
firm or loss of organization knowledge. The constant depreciation rate guarantees that assets
are bounded below some finite value, and also implies that a firm must constantly reinvest in
a segment where it is strong in order to maintain its asset level in that segment.10
I assume there is a constraint on a firm’s total investment in each period:
mi,t + ni,t ≤ 1 (5)
This constraint could hold, for example, due to capital market imperfections (Myers and Majluf
1984) or employees’ limited time and attention. Alternatively, a convex cost of investment
would lead to similar results.11
The .,i,t are iid random variables that follow a distribution with no mass points and
with support on a finite range [0,max]. These variables represent random shocks to firms
assets, for example, due to fortunate discoveries of better production processes, random
experimentation with new product designs that happens to lead to a better understanding
of customer preferences, or unpaid endorsements by celebrities. Note that, while these random
shocks are assumed non-negative, the model does allow for a reduction in a firm’s assets due
to the depreciation term. Asset depreciation combined with an  term that is close to zero for
the period effectively results in a negative shock to the firm’s assets in a segment.
A pure strategy Si = {Si,1, Si,2, . . .} for firm i includes a mapping for each time t of current
asset levels and the history of both firms’ investment decisions into firm i’s current investment
decisions:
Si,t(At−1, ht−1)→ {mi,t, ni,t} (6)
10For example, even today Ben and Jerry’s must continuously reinvest in training its employees and
maintaining its equipment to retain its production expertise at creating chunky ice cream pints. Despite
these efforts, they still occasionally produce “bad batches” of ice cream, in which all of the chunks float to the
bottom. This information was provided to me during a tour of the Ben and Jerry’s factory in Vermont.
11Even if each firm’s capacity for investment grew over time, results similar to those in this paper would still
hold, as along as firms do not reach a point of diminishing returns in their core expertise that causes them to
diversify investment.
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where Ai,t ≡ {Mi,t, Ni,t,Mj,t, Nj,t} and ht is the history of all previous investment decisions for
both firms through time t.12 Typical dynamic investment games impose the restriction that
firms follow stationary Markov strategies, which would imply that strategies do not change
over time and are only a function of the current state variables. Note that the current model
is more general in that it allows strategies to change over time and also allows strategies to
depend on previous investment decisions, which are assumed to be publicly observable.
Finally, both firms have discount factor δ, and Firm i’s objective at each time t is to
maximize its expected discounted profits:
Vi,t(At−1, ht−1, Si, Sj) = E
[ ∞∑
u=t
δu−t
(
pii,M,t + pii,N,t
)∣∣∣∣At−1, ht−1, Si, Sj
]
(7)
A pair of pure strategies {Si, Sj} is a subgame perfect equilibrium if for every t, i, At−1, ht−1,
and alternative strategy S˜i we have Vi,t(At−1, ht−1, Si, Sj) ≥ Vi,t(At−1, ht−1, S˜i, Sj). In other
words, given the current asset levels and history of the game, each player always maximizes
the expected discounted value of its remaining profits given its competitor’s strategy.
I would like to focus on where firms invest, as opposed to whether they invest at all.
Therefore, I assume that C is small enough that, for all possible asset values, each firm can
immediately increase its net profits by investing in at least one segment. A sufficient condition
for this to be true is:
C < F ′(0)− ψ
[1 + max
1− γ
]
(8)
Without this assumption, a firm might want to diversify its investment to preempt is competitor
from investing in either segment.
To summarize, two competing firms allocate investment across two segments; the profit
function involves increasing returns to a firm’s own assets in a segment and a negative
interaction between the focal firm’s assets and its competitor’s assets in a segment; assets
change due to depreciation, investment, and random shocks; there is a constraint to a firm’s
12Formally, h0 = ∅ and for t ≥ 1, ht ≡ {mi,1, ni,1,mj,1, nj,1, . . . ,mi,t, ni,t,mj,t, nj,t}.
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total investment in each period; and firms play a subgame perfect equilibrium in which each
firm maximizes expected discounted profits over an infinite number of periods.
Because this game has an uncountable state space, compact action sets, a countably infinite
number of time periods, and an error term distribution with no mass points, the model conforms
to the assumptions in Chakrabarti (1999), which guarantees a subgame perfect equilibrium
exists. In principle, the game might only have mixed strategy equilibria, although I will derive
conditions in which a pure strategy equilibrium exists.
4 Permanent Differences
Given this model set-up, I now derive conditions in which permanent differences are guaranteed
to arise, with the random shocks determining which firm wins each segment.
To help ensure analytical tractability, this section focuses on the case in which firms are
“myopic,” meaning each firm maximizes its expected profits in the current period without
regard for the future (δ = 0). Starting by analyzing the myopic case is common in the
dynamic investment games literature (e.g., Athey and Schmutzler 2001). One justification
for this approach is that strategies followed by myopic firms approximate those followed
by impatient firms that place small positive weight on future profits; such firms allocate
investment primarily based on where their marginal returns are currently the highest, and
they are generally unwilling to sacrifice short-term profits for long-term gain. Technically,
because expected discounted profits are a continuous function of the discount factor δ, any
strategy that is strictly dominated for δ = 0 is also strictly dominated for any δ sufficiently
small, so firms’ equilibrium policies become arbitrarily close to those described in this section
as their discount factors approach zero. However, section 5 relaxes the assumption that firms
are myopic and explores how my results change if firms are very patient (δ is close to 1).
Given δ = 0, in each period firm i makes investment choice Si,t to maximize E[pii,M,t+pii,N,t]
conditional on firm j’s investment choice Sj,t. A pure strategy equilibrium occurs if neither
firm randomizes its investment choice, and at each time t each firm’s strategy is always optimal
given its competitor’s strategy. Appendix A proves the following preliminary result.
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Lemma 1. If δ = 0, a pure strategy equilibrium exists, and in any pure strategy equilibrium,
for each i and t, Si,t = {1, 0} or Si,t = {0, 1}.
Intuitively, given that each firm’s profit function is convex in its own assets, in any given period
a firm’s optimal strategy is always to focus all of its investment in a single segment. I will
use the terminology “Firm i focuses in the mainstream segment at time t” to indicate that
Si,t = {1, 0} and “Firm i focuses in the niche segment at time t” to indicate that Si,t = {0, 1}.
Also, recall that strategies can depend on the asset state and game history, but for notational
simplicity I often drop these arguments and simply write Si,t instead of Si,t(At−1, ht−1).
In principle, the game could have multiple equilibria. In periods where neither firm has a
dominant strategy, there is one equilibrium in which Firm i focuses in the mainstream segment
while Firm j focuses in the niche segment, and another equilibrium in which these roles are
reversed. For example, if the two segments are the same size (α = 1) or if preemption effects
are very strong (ψ is large enough), then in the first period (in which firms start with zero
assets at state A0 = {0, 0, 0, 0}), either firm might focus in the mainstream segment, while its
competitor focuses in the niche segment.
I would like to derive conditions that rule out such cases, so investment decisions do not
depend on an arbitrary selection of equilibrium. In particular, I derive a set of conditions that
ensure there is a unique equilibrium in which firms initially focus in the mainstream segment
(Si,1 = Sj,1 = {1, 0}), but they later become permanently focused on different segments, with
the random shocks determining which firm focuses on each segment.
There are three conditions required for this result to hold. Intuitively, these conditions
place restrictions on the size of the niche segment, the strength of competitive preemption
effects, and the size of the largest possible random shocks. There is tension among the three
conditions in that each of these parameters must be neither too high nor too low.
Condition 1 requires that the niche segment (α) is small enough and preemption effects
(ψ) are weak enough that firms initially race for the mainstream segment; whereas condition 2
requires that the niche segment is large enough and preemption effects are strong enough that
one firm will eventually concede the battle for this segment and switch its focus. Similarly,
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condition 2 requires that the upper bound on random shocks (max) is large enough that they
eventually cause enough of a gap between the firms that one firm switches focus, but condition
3 requires that this bound is small enough that firms do not continue making strategic changes
due to random fluctuations over time. When all of these conditions hold, random fluctuations
in assets are guaranteed to lead to large permanent differences.
In order to specify these conditions more precisely, I first define the following operators.
For simplicity of notation, I have suppressed the subscripts on the  terms; recall that these
terms are assumed to be iid.
B(X) ≡ E
[
F (X + 1 + )− F (X + )
]
(9)
L(X) ≡ ψE[X + ] (10)
Intuitively, B(X) gives the expected profit increase from investing one unit in the mainstream
segment if a firm’s asset level in this segment is X, not accounting for competitive preemption
effects. L(X) gives the marginal expected loss due to preemption effects from investing one unit
in the mainstream segment if the competitor has asset level of X in this segment, accounting for
the competitor’s expected random shock in the segment. For the niche segment, these values
need to be scaled by α. These operators make it possible to express the following conditions
more clearly.
The first key condition states for all X ∈ [0, 1
1−γ
]
and all Y ≤ (Xmax) the following holds:
Condition 1.
B(γX)− L
(
γX(1 + max) + 1
)
> α
[
B(γY )− L(γY )] (11)
Because this condition applies when X and Y both equal zero, it ensures that both firms
initially have a dominant strategy of investing in the mainstream segment. This condition also
ensures that firms continue racing for the mainstream segment as long as the relative asset
differences between them is not too large.
On a more technical level, I show that Condition 1 guarantees that at least one firm always
has a dominant strategy of investing in the mainstream segment. This implies there is a
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unique equilibrium in each period in which the firm with a dominant strategy focuses in the
mainstream segment and its competitor plays its best response to this strategy. (See the proof
of Proposition 1 in Appendix A for more details.) Thus, the choice of where each firm focuses
its investment is driven by random shocks and not by equilibrium selection.
The second key condition needed for random shocks to cause permanent differences is:
Condition 2.
B(γXM)− L(γXH + 1) < α
[
B(γXL)− L(0)
]
(12)
where XL = max
(
1
1−γ
)
, XM =
(
1
1−γ
)
, and XH = (1 + max)
(
1
1−γ
)
. This condition ensures
that a large enough gap eventually opens between the firms that one switches focus to the
niche segment.
The third key condition is:
Condition 3.
B(γXL)− L(γXM + 1) < α
[
B(γXM)− L(γXL)
]
(13)
where XL and XM are defined as above. This condition ensures that once firms have focused
on different segments long enough, random shocks will never cause them to switch their focus.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the implications of these condition graphically.13 Together
these three conditions ensure that firms initially race for the mainstream segment (condition
1), that eventually random shocks lead to a large enough gap between them that one firm
changes its strategy and repeatedly focuses on the niche segment (condition 2), and that this
leads to permanent differences between the firms with no further strategic changes (condition
3). These observations are formalized in the following result.
13To provide additional intuition for these conditions, a supplemental appendix available on the author’s
website (Supplemental Appendix B) presents an example of a model of per-period competition, and derives
parameter values for which these conditions hold for that particular model of competition.
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Proposition 1. If δ = 0 and Conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold, then with probability one firms have
unique equilibrium strategies at every time t given asset levels At−1. In equilibrium, both firms
initially focus their investment in the mainstream segment, but the firms eventually become
permanently focused on different segments. Formally, Si,1(A0) = Sj,1(A0) = {1, 0}, and there
exists a T for which one of the following is true:
(1) Si,t(At−1) = {1, 0} and Sj,t(At−1) = {0, 1} for all t > T or
(2) Si,t(At−1) = {0, 1} and Sj,t(At−1) = {1, 0} for all t > T
The proof of this proposition in Appendix A follows the intuition outlined above, while formally
confirming that the game will, with probability one, evolve as described.14
Note that Conditions 1 and 2 can only hold simultaneously if there are increasing returns.
In fact, increasing returns play a key role in this result. Intuitively, under the conditions of this
proposition, a firm only switches focus to the niche segment after its recent shocks have been
14In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, strategies depend on the asset state (At−1), but not on investment
histories (ht−1), so I have only included the former argument in the strategies. By contrast, equilibrium
strategies in Proposition 3 will depend on both At−1 and ht−1.
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stronger in the niche segment (moving it up the increasing returns curve in that segment),
and its competitor’s recent shocks have been stronger in the mainstream segment (generating
strong preemption effects in that segment). Only one firm can be in such a position at a time,
and so there is always at most one firm that is willing to switch to the niche segment, and
there can never be multiple equilibria.
5 Major Strategic Changes
The previous section derived conditions that guarantee permanent differences arise. By
contrast, the current section shows that if we allow sufficiently large random shocks or if
firms are sufficiently patient, firms can make major strategic changes over time.
As the size of the largest random shock grows, the boxed regions in Figure 3 grow until
they become arbitrarily close to intersecting. This ensures that a firm focusing on the niche
segment will eventually come close enough to its rival that its best strategy is to attack the
mainstream segment.
Proposition 2. If δ = 0 and Conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold, then with probability one firms
have unique equilibrium strategies at every time t given asset levels At−1. In equilibrium, both
firms initially focus their investment in the mainstream segment for at least one period, and
one firm eventually switches focus to the niche segment; however, this firm later switches focus
back again to the mainstream segment.
When the conditions of this proposition hold, over time both firms continually shift their focus
due to random fluctuations.
Results so far have focused on the case when each firm is myopic. Such a firm bases its
investment decisions entirely on where its current marginal returns are highest, given its own
state and given its competitor’s state. These previous results also approximate the behavior of
impatient firms that place small positive weight on future profits. On the other hand, I now
show how the results change when firms are patient and place large weight on future profits.
A forward-looking firm must take into account how its decision in any given period affects
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the future state of the game and the future behavior of its competitor. Also, as firms become
more patient, they become willing to battle for the mainstream segment for a longer period
of time in the hope of eventually winning this segment. In fact, I show that if firms become
patient enough, then regardless of their current assets there is always an equilibrium in which
a firm focusing on the niche segment changes its strategy and attacks the mainstream segment.
Formally, assume the following condition holds:
Condition 4.
F (XH) + αF (0)− ψ
( 1
1− γ
)
XM < F (XL) + αF (XM)− ψα
( 1
1− γ
)
XL (14)
where XH , XM , and XL are defined as in the previous section.
Intuitively, Condition 4 is a stronger version of Condition 3. This new condition implies
that preemption effects are strong enough that, if the competitor’s strategy is always to focus
on the mainstream segment, then the focal firm’s long-run profits from attacking this segment
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are lower than its profits from staying focused on the niche segment, even if random shocks
turn out to be most favorable to such an attack.
We might expect that this condition would ensure permanent differences arise, and in fact
it does ensure there is an equilibrium in which firms stay permanently focused on different
segments. However, condition 4 also guarantees that if both firms are sufficiently patient, and
if the firm focused on the niche segment adopts an aggressive strategy of always attacking
the mainstream segment, then its competitor’s best response is eventually to retreat from this
segment. As a result, when both firms are sufficiently patient, major strategic changes are
always possible regardless of the history of the game.
Proposition 3. If Condition 4 holds, there exists a δ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ≥ δ̂, then for
any possible history of the game, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which from this
period forward Firm i always focuses its investment in the mainstream segment, and Firm
j eventually becomes permanently focused in the niche segment. Formally, for any time T ,
feasible asset state AT−1, and game history hT−1, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in
which Si,t(At−1, ht−1) = {1, 0} for all t ≥ T , and Sj,t(At−1, ht−1) converges to {0, 1} as t→∞.
There is also another subgame perfect equilibrium in which these roles are reversed.
The formal proof in Appendix A shows that, under the conditions of the proposition, neither
firm has an incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium. Intuitively, a very patient firm
is willing to sacrifice short-term profits, shift its investment out of its existing area of expertise
in the small segment, and start building assets in the larger segment. If the competitor is also
sufficiently patient, then its best response to this strategy is eventually to retreat from the
larger segment and shift focus to the smaller segment.
6 Model Extension: Asset Destruction
One counterintuitive implication of this model is that a firm can sometimes benefit from a
decrease in its own assets. For example, imagine a firm has a lead in the mainstream segment,
but not large enough a lead to cause its competitor to switch focus to the niche segment. The
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firm might benefit from a reduction in its own niche assets, which could entice the competitor
to focus on the niche segment.
To formalize this intuition, I now extend the model to allow each firm to destroy some
of its own assets. At the beginning of each period t, Firm i chooses a mainstream asset
level anywhere in the range [0,Mi,t−1], and chooses a niche asset level in the range [0, Ni,t−1],
while Firm j makes analogous choices. Choosing an asset level below the top of these ranges
represents partial asset destruction.
The game timing at each period is now: (1) Firms simultaneously make asset destruction
decisions in both segments. (2) Firms simultaneously make investment decisions. (3) Random
shocks occur, and profits are realized.
For analytical tractability, I again focus on the case of myopic firms. Note that a myopic
firm may want to destroy some of its assets at the start of the period to affect the current
period’s investment choices. Appendix A contains a formal proof of the following result.
Proposition 4. If δ = 0 and Conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold, there exist asset levels for which
there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which one firm chooses to destroy some of its niche
assets.
For such a strategy to work, it is important for asset destruction to be publicly observable
and irreversible. Otherwise, a firm might want to temporarily reduce its niche assets at the
start of the period in order to influence its competitor’s investment decision, but then restore
those “destroyed” assets before the end of the period.
7 Conclusion
This paper has developed a model in which firms dynamically compete for different market
segments. Under certain conditions, each firm becomes permanently focused on the segment
where it has the best initial luck.
This model could help explain why regional differences in the market shares of consumer
packaged goods (CPG) makers tend to persist over such long time periods — manufacturers
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founded on the West Coast continue to have higher market share there, whereas those founded
on the East Coast continue to have higher market share there, in some cases even after 100
years of competition (Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dube´ 2007, 2009). This model implies that
in CPG markets, where key assets like brands undergo relatively small random shocks in any
given year, there should be persistent differences between firms. On the other hand, in markets
for high tech products, in which assets like up-to-date technical expertise are subject to large
shocks as new technologies arrive and displace old ones, large changes in strategy should be
more common.
A surprising insight from the model is that a firm might want to deliberately reduce its
assets in a particular segment. For example, a company might want to spin off a division that
focuses on a small niche segment as a way of committing to limit the resources available to
this division, thus enticing its competitor to invest in the niche segment.
Future research could extend the model to incorporate several important phenomena that
were not addressed in the current paper. For example, firms often face uncertainty over
exogenous factors such as demand for a product (Hitsch 2006), the firm’s underlying efficiency
(Jovanovic 1982); these factors can lead firms to exit the market or reposition a product as new
information arrives. In addition, while the current paper has focused on dynamic investment
allocation decisions, firms can also dynamically adjust their prices, for example, by offering a
different price to their current customers, which then influences the size of their loyal customer
base in future periods (Villas-Boas 1999; Shin and Sudhir 2010). It would be interesting to
extend the model to explore how these phenomena affect optimal investment behavior.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Given δ = 0, at each time t Firm i chooses investment levels {mi,t, ni,t}
to maximize E
[
pii,M,t(mi,t,mj,t) + pii,N,t(ni,t, nj,t)
]
subject to mi,t + ni,t ≤ 1, conditional on
Firm j’s investment choices {mj,t, nj,t}. I will first show it can never be an optimal for Firm
i to choose any investment levels other than {1, 0} or {0, 1}. By differentiating firm i’s profit
function in each segment, we have:
dE[pii,M,t]
dmi,t
= E
[
F ′(γMi,t−1 +mi,t + m,i,t)
]
− ψE
[
γMj,t−1 +mj,t + m,j,t
]
− C (A1)
dE[pii,N,t]
dni,t
= α
[
E
[
F ′(γNi,t−1 + ni,t + n,i,t)
]
− ψE
[
γNj,t−1 + nj,t + n,j,t
]]
− C (A2)
Inequality (8) ensures that (A1) is positive for any feasible asset values. This implies that
Firm i would never set mi,t + ni,t < 1 because it could always increase its expected profits by
increasing mi,t until its investment constraint is binding, that is, until mi,t + ni,t = 1. We can
therefore substitute (1−mi,t) for ni,t and rewrite Firm i’s objective as maximizing:
E
[
pii,M,t(mi,t,mj,t) + pii,N,t(1−mi,t, nj,t)
]
subject to mi,t ∈ [0, 1]. The assumption that F ′′ > 0
implies that this expected profit function is convex in mi,t, and the maximum must occur
at one of the extreme points mi,t = 0 or mi,t = 1. Thus, the only possible optimal levels for
{mi,t, ni,t} are {1, 0} or {0, 1}. Although there could be mixed strategy equilibria in which firms
randomize between these two investment choices, I will show that a pure strategy equilibrium
must exist.
Considering that {1, 0} or {0, 1} are the only possible optimal strategies, Firm i’s best
response to {mj,t, nj,t} is to choose {1, 0} if the following inequality holds:
E
[
pii,M,t(1,mj,t)− pii,M,t(0,mj,t)
] ≥ E[pii,N,t(1, nj,t)− pii,N,t(0, nj,t)] (A3)
If this inequality does not hold, then Firm i’s best response is {0, 1}.
If either firm has a dominant strategy, there is a pure strategy equilibrium in which this
firm plays its dominant strategy and its competitor plays a best response to this dominant
strategy.
On the other hand, suppose neither firm has a dominant strategy, so that each firm might
have a best response of either {1, 0} or {0, 1} depending on what its competitor does. Note
that Firm i’s marginal returns to investing in the mainstream segment, given by (A1), are
decreasing in mj,t, while its marginal returns to investing in the niche segment, given by (A2),
are decreasing in nj,t. In other words, a firm’s marginal investment returns in a segment become
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lower if its competitor invests in that segment. As a result, if Firm i does not have a dominant
strategy, its best response to {1, 0} must be {0, 1} and its best response to {0, 1} must be
{1, 0}. Analogous results hold for Firm j. Thus, if neither firm has a dominant strategy, there
is a pure strategy equilibrium in which Firm i plays {1, 0} while Firm j plays {0, 1}, and
another pure strategy equilibrium in which these roles are reversed.
Together these results guarantee that there is a pure strategy equilibrium of each possible
subgame at every time t. QED
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof proceeds in three steps. I will show that under the
conditions of this proposition: (1) With probability one, at each time t ≥ 1 there is a unique
pure strategy equilibrium in which at least one firm (which we label Firm i) has a dominant
strategy of setting Si,t = {1, 0}. (2) With probability one, there exists a T > 0 such that one
firm (which we label Firm i) has assets Mi,T ∈ [XM , XH ] and Ni,T ∈ [0, XL], while the other
firm (which we label Firm j) has assets Mj,T ∈ [0, XL] and Nj,T ∈ [XM , XH ]. (3) For all t > T ,
there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which Si,t = {1, 0} and Sj,t = {0, 1}.
Step 1:
Note that if firm i has always invested in the mainstream segment for t periods, its assets
then lie in a region that is a square with width determined by the largest possible random
shock:
t∑
u=1
γt−1 ≤Mi,t ≤
t∑
u=1
γt−1(1 + max) (A4)
0 ≤ Ni,t ≤
t∑
u=1
γt−1max (A5)
The box enclosed by the dashed lines in Figure 1 provides an example of how this region looks
after a finite number of periods.
I will show that Condition 1 guarantees that for all t at least one firm always lies in the
regions defined by (A4) and (A5). Condition 1 immediately implies that both firms have a
dominant strategy of investing in the mainstream segment in period one, so both firms’ assets
lie in this region in the first period. I will show that if at least one firm lies in this region at
time t, then at least one firm will also lie in the region at time t+ 1.
Suppose both firms lie in this region at time t. Without loss of generality, label the firms
such that Ni,t ≤ Nj,t. Inequalities (A4) and (A5) imply Ni < Mimax. Therefore, Condition 1
implies:
B(γMi)− L
(
γMi(1 + max) + 1
)
> α
[
B(γNi)− L(γNi)
]
(A6)
Both firms assets satisfying (A4) and (A5) implies that Mj < Mi(1 + max), and the firms were
labeled such that Nj > Ni. Therefore, because B
′ > 0 and L′ > 0, (A6) implies:
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B(γMi)− L(γMj + 1) > α
[
B(γNi)− L(γNj)
]
(A7)
Thus, firm i has a dominant strategy of investing in the mainstream segment, which guarantees
that it will focus in the mainstream segment again in period t+ 1.
Now suppose only Firm i’s assets satisfy (A4) and (A5) at time t. If Ni ≤ Nj, the same
argument as above holds. On the other hand, even if Ni > Nj, I will show that Firm i still
must have a dominant strategy of investing in the mainstream region. In this case, we must
have Mi > Mj, or Firm j’s assets would satisfy (A4) and (A5) too. Also, because Firm i’s
assets satisfy (A4) and (A5), we have Ni ≤ (Mimax). These two facts imply that:
Mi(1 + max) > Mj +Ni (A8)
By substituting the right side of (A8) into (A6) we have:
B(γMi)− L(γMj + γNi + 1) > α
[
B(γNi)− L(γNi)
]
(A9)
Because L is a linear function, this is equivalent to:
B(γMi)− L(γMj + 1)− L(γNi) > α
[
B(γNi)− L(γNi)
]
(A10)
Because α < 1, this implies that:
B(γMi)− L(γMj + 1) > α
[
B(γNi)
]
(A11)
Because L is non-negative, this implies that:
B(γMi)− L(γMj + 1) > α
[
B(γNi)− L(γNj)
]
(A12)
Thus, Condition 1 still implies Firm i has a dominant strategy of investing in the mainstream
segment, and it will stay in the mainstream focus region in the next period.
To summarize, I have shown that at least one firm’s assets satisfy (A4) and (A5) in period
1; and that if at least one firm is in this region in period t then the same will be true in period
t+ 1; this guarantees that at least one firm will always be in this region.
We have established that in each period one firm (call if Firm i) has a dominant strategy
of focusing in the mainstream segment. Thus, in each period there is a unique equilibrium in
which this firm sets Si,t = {1, 0} and its competitor plays its best response to this strategy.
(Technically, there are two equilibria (not a unique equilibrium) if Firm j is exactly indifferent
between setting Sj,t = {1, 0} and Sj,t = {0, 1} in response to Si,t = {1, 0}; however, the strict
convexity of the profit functions and the assumption that error terms have no mass points
ensure that assets have zero probability of landing precisely at such a state, so the equilibrium
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is unique with probability one).
Step 2:
I will now show that one firm (let us call it Firm j) eventually switches its focus to the
niche segment and its assets then enter region defined by: Mj ∈ [0, XL] and Nj ∈ [XM , XH ],
where XL, XM , and XH are defined as in section 4.
By the results shown in Step 1, at any time t at least one firm’s assets are in the region
defined by (A4) and (A5). If only one firm is in this region, label this firm Firm i. If both
firms are in the region, label the one with lower niche assets as Firm i. The results from step
one of the proof imply Firm i focuses in the mainstream segment in the current period. Now
suppose Firm i receives shocks {max, 0}, while firm j receives shocks {0, max}. (Technically,
the argument holds if firms receive shocks sufficiently close to these values.) These shocks
ensure that Firm i’s assets remain in the region defined by (A4) and (A5); if Firm j’s assets
were not in this region, they do not enter this region in the next period; and if Firm i had lower
niche assets than Firm j, this continues to be the case in the next time period. Therefore, the
results from Step 1 guarantee that Firm i focuses in the mainstream segment again in the next
time period.
If the firms repeatedly continue receiving such shocks, then Firm i always focuses in the
mainstream segment and its assets converge to point {XH , 0}, and regardless of where Firm j
focuses its assets reach a point where Mj < XM + d and Nj > XL− d for any positive d. If we
choose d > 0 sufficiently small, then Condition 2 guarantees that Firm j focuses in the niche
segment if Mj,t < XM + d, Nj,t > XL− d, Mi,t > XH − d, and Ni,t < d. Thus, given this series
of shocks, Firm j eventually focuses in the niche segment. If the firms still continue receiving
such shocks, Firm j’s niche assets grow while its mainstream assets shrink, so it continues
focusing in the niche segment, and eventually its assets enter the region where Mj ∈ [0, XL]
and Nj ∈ [XM , XH ].
The law of large numbers guarantees that such a series of shocks eventually occurs with
probability one. To see why, let Z be the minimum number of such shocks needed to ensure
that, from any feasible starting point, firms reach a state where Mj ∈ [0, XL] and Nj ∈
[XM , XH ]. Now define a sequence of random variables z1, z2, . . . , where z1 equals 1 if such
shocks occur in each of the first Z time periods of the game and equals 0 otherwise, z2 is
defined equivalently for the next Z time periods, and so on. Note that the expectation of
each variable is positive because there is always positive probability of this sequence of shocks
occurring. The law of large numbers guarantees that the average of these variables converges
to their expectation, which can only occur if such a sequence of shocks eventually does occur.
Thus, Firm j’s assets eventually enter the proposed region. Intuitively, because it is always
possible for firms to have a string of good luck in different segments, if the game continues long
enough such a string of shocks will eventually occur. Also, note that the labeling of Firm j
was based on the state before this series of shocks occurred; depending on the early shocks in
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the game, either firm could be the one we label “Firm j,” so either could end up in the niche
segment.
Step 3:
We have established that for some T > 0, one firm (call it Firm i) has assets that satisfy
Mi,T ∈ [XM , XH ] and Ni,T ∈ [0, XL], while the other firm (call it Firm j) has assets that satisfy
Mj,T ∈ [0, XL] and Nj,T ∈ [XM , XH ].
Condition 3, along with the assumptions of increasing returns and a negative interaction
with the competitor’s assets, imply that whenever each firm’s assets are in the regions given
above, Firm i focuses in the mainstream segment and Firm j focuses in the niche segment.
Therefore, each firm stays in its respective region in the next period. Thus, they will always
remain in these regions. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: Steps 1 and 2 from the proof of Proposition 1 still hold. The only
difference is we are now assuming Condition 3 does not hold, so Step 3 of Proposition 1 no
longer holds.
Label the firm with larger niche assets as Firm j. Now suppose Firm j receives a series
of shocks with values {max, 0}, while firm i receives a series of shocks with values {0, max}.
(As in the previous proof, the argument still holds if firms receive shocks sufficiently close to
these values.) Given this series of shocks, Firm i’s assets will converge to point {XM , XL},
while Firm j’s assets will converge to point {XL, XM}. Because Condition 3 no longer holds,
once both firms are within a small enough distance d from these points, Firm j switches its
investment focus to the mainstream segment, and if the firms continue receiving such shocks,
Firm j continues focusing in the mainstream segment and eventually enters the region given
by (A4) and (A5).
As in the previous proof, because this entire sequence of events has positive probability of
occurring in finite amount of time, the law of large numbers guarantees that it does eventually
occur. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: I will show that, under the conditions of the proposition, the
subgame starting at any time T has an equilibrium in which Firm i plays the “aggressive”
strategy of always investing in the mainstream segment and Firm j plays a best response to
this strategy. (By symmetry, this subgame also has another equilibrium in which these roles
are reversed.)
I first define a new variable at ∈ {i, j} which is a function of the firms’ investment history
since time T and indicates which firm is currently playing an “aggressive” strategy. Regardless
of the starting asset state, AT−1, I show that there is an equilibrium in which aT = i, and for
all t > T the game proceeds as follows: (1) the firm designated as aggressive by the variable
at focuses in the mainstream segment at time t; (2) if the aggressive firm stays with this
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equilibrium strategy at time t, then at+1 = at (the same firm stays aggressive in the next
period); however, if the aggressive firm deviates from this equilibrium strategy, then at+1 6= at
(the other firm then becomes the aggressive one); (3) the firm that is not aggressive eventually
becomes permanently focused on the niche segment.
The proof proceeds in two steps. The first step shows that the non-aggressive firm does
not want to deviate from this equilibrium, and the second step shows that the aggressive firm
also does not want to deviate.
Step 1:
Let aT = i, so Firm j is the non-aggressive firm. Given the proposed equilibrium, Firm i
will always invest in the mainstream segment regardless of what Firm j does, so Firm j simply
plays a best response to this strategy.
Suppose we fix Firm i’s assets at the point {XM , XL}, and Firm j knows that its shocks
will always be {max, 0}. Note that Firm j’s assets converge to the point {XL, XM} if and only
if its investment strategy converges to setting mj,t = 0 and nj,t = 1. Given such a strategy, as
δ → 1, Firm j’s value function satisfies:
(1− δ)Vj,t = (1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
u=t
δu−t
(
pij,M,t + pij,N,t
)]
−→
δ→1
[
pij,M(XM , XL) + pij,N(XL, XM)− C
]
(A13)
where we define:
pij,M(Mj,t,Mi,t) = F (Mj,t)−G(Mi,t)− ψMj,tMi,t (A14)
pij,N(Nj,t, Ni,t) = α
[
F (Nj,t)−G(Ni,t)− ψNj,tNi,t
]
(A15)
Intuitively, as firms become very patient, the discounted value of their profits depends only on
the long-run value to which their profits converge. By Condition 4, we have:
pij,M(XM , XL) + pii,N(XL, XM) > pij,M(XM , XH) + pij,N(XL, 0) (A16)
Because each firm’s profits are a convex function of its own assets, for any θ ∈ (0, 1):
pij,M(XM , XL) + pii,N(XL, XM) > pij,M
(
XM , θXL + (1− θ)XH
)
+ pij,N
(
XL, θXM
)
(A17)
Thus, Firm j’s long-run profits are maximized when its assets converge to {XL, XM}, and any
strategy for which this does not occur implies that as δ → 1, then (1 − δ)Vj,t converges to a
value strictly less than the right side of (A13). Thus, as long as δ is sufficiently high, so Firm j
places enough weight on future profits, its best response is eventually to become permanently
focused in the niche segment.
Note that the above derivation assumed Firm j’s shocks were most favorable to it investing
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in the mainstream segment. Any other set of shocks would cause Firm j to favor investing in
the niche segment even more strongly. Similarly, if Firm i’s mainstream assets exceed XM , or
its niche assets are less than XL, this also makes investing in the niche segment relatively more
profitable for Firm j. In fact, given Firm i’s strategy of always focusing in the mainstream
segment, its assets are guaranteed to permanently cross the threshold at which Mi > XM and
Ni < XL within finite amount of time. Thus, as long as δ is sufficiently large, Firm j’s best
response requires that it eventually becomes permanently focuses in the niche segment. We
have showed that Firm j does not deviate from the proposed equilibrium. The next step is to
show that Firm i also does not deviate from this equilibrium.
Step 2:
Given aT = i at time T , as long as Firm i always focuses in the mainstream segment from
this point forward, then at = i for all t > T , and Firm j starts focusing in the niche segment
within a finite amount of time (as shown in Step 1). In this case, as δ → 1, Firm i’s value
function satisfies:
(1− δ)Vi,t −→
δ→1
E
[
pii,M
(
XM + ˜i,m, ˜j,m
)
+ pii,N
(
˜i,n, XM + ˜j,n
)
− C
]
(A18)
where we define ˜i,m ≡
∑∞
t=0 γ
ti,m,t, and the other ˜ variables are defined similarly.
On the other hand, if Firm i ever deviates and does not focus in the mainstream segment
at any time t, then at+1 = j. Firm j then focuses on the mainstream segment from that point
forward, and Firm i begins focusing on the niche segment within finite amount of time. In this
case, as δ → 1, Firm i’s value function satisfies:
(1− δ)Vi,t −→
δ→1
E
[
pii,M
(
˜i,m, XM + ˜j,m
)
+ pii,N
(
XM + ˜i,n, ˜j,n
)
− C
]
(A19)
It follows immediately from the fact that the profit functions are increasing in a firm’s
own assets and decreasing in the competitor’s assets, and from the fact that the niche profit
function is simply the mainstream profit function scaled by α < 1, that the right side of (A18)
is greater than the right side of (A19). Therefore, even if Firm i’s short-run profits are higher
if it focuses in the niche segment, as long as it places sufficient weight on future profits, it will
not deviate from the proposed equilibrium.
Let δ̂ be the minimum value needed for both Steps 1 and 2 to hold. As long as δ exceeds this
value, and Condition 4 holds, we have shown that, regardless of the history of the game, there
is an equilibrium in which Firm i always focuses on the mainstream segment from the current
period forward, and Firm j eventually starts focusing in the niche segment. By symmetry,
there is also an equilibrium in which these roles are reversed. Thus, the game always has
multiple equilibria regardless of its current state. QED
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Proof of Proposition 4: I will show there exist asset values such that there is an equilibrium
in which Firm i destroys some of in its own niche assets and Firm j does not destroy any assets.
Suppose firm j has assets {XM , XL}, while Firm i has assets {XH , Ni}, where Ni ∈ [0, XL].
Condition 1 guarantees that Firm i invests in the mainstream segment at any such state. On
the other hand, Condition 1 guarantees that Firm j invests in the mainstream segment if
Ni = XL, while Condition 2 guarantees that Firm j invests in the niche segment if Ni = 0.
Intuitively, given the negative interaction term in each firm’s profit function, a reduction in
Firm i’s niche assets makes it more attractive for Firm j to invest in the niche rather than
mainstream segment. Let N̂i denote the cut-off value such that there is an equilibrium in which
Firm j invests in the niche segment for Ni = N̂i but invests in the mainstream segment for
Ni > N̂i.
Consider the case when Firm i’s niche assets are N̂i + d, where d > 0. If neither firm
destroys any assets, then both firms invest in the mainstream segment, and Firm i’s expected
profits are:
E
[
pii,M
(
γXH + 1 + i,m,t, γXM + 1 + j,m,t
)
+pii,N
(
γ(N̂i + d) + i,n,t, γXL + j,n,t
)]
−C (A20)
On the other hand, if Firm i chooses to reduce its niche assets to N̂i, then Firm i invests in the
mainstream segment while Firm j invests in the niche segment, and Firm i’s expected profits
are:
E
[
pii,M
(
γXH + 1 + i,m,t, γXM + j,m,t
)
+ pii,N
(
γN̂i + i,n,t, γXL + 1 + j,n,t
)]
− C (A21)
As d approaches zero, then (A21) minus (A20) approaches:
E
[
G
(
γXM + 1 + j,m,t
)
−G
(
γXM + j,m,t
)
+ αG
(
γXL + j,n,t
)
− αG
(
γXL + 1 + j,n,t
)]
+ L(γXH + 1)− αL(γN̂i)
(A22)
By the assumption that G′′ ≥ −ψ, the sum of the four terms in the expectation operator is
greater than −ψγ(XM −XL). And because L(X)− L(Y ) = ψ(X − Y ) for any X and Y , the
sum of the last two terms is greater than ψ(γXH + 1 − γN̂i). This implies that expression
(A22) is greater than:
−ψγ(XM −XL) + ψγ(XH − N̂i) + ψ (A23)
Because XH > XM and N̂i < XL, this expression is always strictly greater than zero. Thus,
Firm i’s expected profits increase when it reduces its assets from N̂i + d to N̂i. Intuitively, as
d becomes becomes sufficiently small, the direct impact on Firm i’s profits from reducing its
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own niche assets approaches zero. However, the indirect effect from enticing Firm j to change
its investment stays strictly positive, resulting in an overall increase in Firm i’s profits.
We have shown that if Firm j has asset levels {XM , XL}, Firm i has asset levels {XH , N̂i+d}
with d sufficiently small, and Firm j does not destroy any assets, then Firm i’s best response
is to reduce its niche assets to N̂i.
We now need to show that Firm j’s best response is not destroy any of its assets.
To demonstrate this, I will show that Firm j’s asset destruction cannot influence Firm i’s
investment behavior. Condition 1 implies that:
B(γXH)− L(γXH + 1) > α
[
B(γN̂i)− L(γN̂i)
]
(A24)
Because XH −XM = XL > N̂i, this implies that:
B(γXH)− L(γXM + 1) > α
[
B(γN̂i)− L(0)
]
(A25)
This implies that even if Firm j reduces its niche assets to zero, Firm i still has a dominant
strategy of investing in the mainstream segment. Thus, Firm j reducing its assets would
directly reduce its own profits without affecting Firm i’s investment behavior in the current
period, and so Firm j does not engage in asset destruction, and the proposed equilibrium
holds. QED
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Supplemental Appendices
Abstract
These supplemental appendices will not appear in the paper, but will be available on the
author’s website. Appendix B presents a model of competition consistent with the profit
functions used in the paper. Appendix C studies diversification. Appendix D presents
results for the special case in which there are no interactions between firms’ investment
decisions.
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Appendix B. Microfoundation for Profit Functions
I now present a simply theoretical example of competition that is consistent with the per-period
profit functions used in this model.
Assume firms i and j compete in two segments. Each firm sells a separate product in each
segment, and customers will only purchase a product targeted toward their particular segment.
In each segment, firms are (exogenously) located at opposite ends of a Hotelling line of length
1. In the mainstream segment, customers have mass 1, and in the niche segment they have
mass α, where α ≤ 1.
Firms invest in assets that improve their quality on a vertical dimension, which is orthogonal
to the Hotelling line. Recall that Mi,t and Ni,t are firm i’s assets devoted to the mainstream and
niche segment, respectively, at time t. A mainstream customer located a distance d from firm
i receives utility U − kd+Mi,t−Pi,m,t from purchasing firm i’s product, where k is customers’
transportation cost and Pi,m,t is firm i’s price in the mainstream segment. Without loss of
generality set marginal production cost equal to zero.
We focus on parameter values are in a range where the market is covered and both firms
have positive demand in equilibrium. Formally, we need the constant U > 3k
2
, and we also
need for each firm’s assets in each segment to lie in the range [0, 3k], which will always be true
if the depreciation factor satisfies γ < 1− 1+max
3k
. At any time t, demand for firm i’s product
in each segment is given by:
Di,m,t =
1
2
+
Mi,t −Mj,t − Pi,m,t + Pj,m,t
2k
(B1)
Di,n,t = α
[
1
2
+
Ni,t −Nj,t − Pi,n,t + Pj,n,t
2k
]
(B2)
Solving firm i’s first-order condition in the mainstream segment we have:
P ∗i,M,t =
k
2
+
Mi,t −Mj,t
2
+
P ∗j,M,t
2
(B3)
If we then solve for firm j’s analogous first order condition and plug the resulting expression
for P ∗j,M,t into the above equation, we derive the following equilibrium price and demand for
firm i in the mainstream segment:
P ∗i,M,t = k +
Mi,t −Mj,t
3
(B4)
D∗i,M,t =
1
2
+
Mi,t −Mj,t
6k
(B5)
Multiplying these two together, firm i’s equilibrium mainstream profits are:
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pi∗i,M,t =
k
2
+
Mi,t −Mj,t
3
+
[
Mi,t −Mj,t
]2
18k
=
k
2
+
Mi,t
3
+
M2i,t
18k
− Mj,t
3
+
M2j,t
18k
− Mi,tMj,t
9k
(B6)
Equilibrium profits in the niche segment are analogous, except that they are scaled by α
because the segment is smaller.
Note this profit function is consistent with the profit functions (1) and (2), including
increasing returns to a firm’s own assets in a segment and a negative interaction between
the focal firm’s assets and the competitor’s assets in a segment. Intuitively, when a firm has
higher equilibrium demand (either because its own assets are high or its competitor’s assets
are low in a particular segment), incremental improvements in its product quality allow it to
raise its price and collect incremental profits from a larger number of customers, which implies
marginal returns to quality are higher.15
Parameter Values for Conditions 1 to 3
I now derive parameter values for which the model of competition developed in this appendix
is consistent with Conditions 1 to 3 from the main body of the paper. Given the equilibrium
profits (B6), the operator (9) is equivalent to:
B(X) =
1
3
+
1
18k
E
[
(X + 1 + )2 − (X + )2
]
=
1
3
+
1
18k
+
X + E
[

]
9k
(B7)
Also, given (B6), the operator (10) is equivalent to:
L(Y ) =
Y + E
[

]
9k
(B8)
This implies that:
B(X)− L(Y ) = 6k + 1 + 2(X − Y )
18k
(B9)
Plugging (B9) into Conditions 1 to 3, we have:
15This is just one example of how increasing returns can arise from strategic interactions. In principle, we
could also generate microfoundations with increasing returns based on word-of-mouth effects or learning curves,
for example. The specific sources of increasing returns will depend on the details of the particular industry in
question. In order to focus on the dynamic interactions between firms, the rest of the paper uses the general
profit functions given by (1) and (2), rather than focusing on a particular model of per-period competition.
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Condition 1: α <
6k − 1− 2
(
γ
1−γ
)
max
6k + 1
Condition 2: α >
6k − 1− 2
(
γ
1−γ
)
max
6k + 1 + 2
(
γ
1−γ
)
max
Condition 3: α >
6k − 1− 2
(
γ
1−γ
)(
1− max
)
6k + 1 + 2
(
γ
1−γ
)(
1− max
)
Intuitively, Condition 1, which ensures at least one firm always has a dominant strategy of
focusing in the mainstream segment, is more likely to hold when: the niche segment is small
(a small), preemption effects are weak (which is true in this model when k is large), and when
the potential gap that can open between firms focusing in the same segment is small (which
is true when γ and max are small). Condition 2, which ensures one firm eventually switches
focus to the niche segment, is more likely to hold in the opposite of these cases. Thus, there is
tension between these first two conditions, but there is a range of parameter values in which
both hold. Finally, Condition 3, which ensures firms do not keep switching back and forth
between segments, is similar to Condition 2 except that Condition 2 requires that max be
sufficiently large, while Condition 3 requires that max be sufficiently small.
As an example of parameter values that satisfy these conditions, if we set k = 4, α = 0.6,
γ = 0.85, max = 0.5, all three conditions hold, which means Proposition 1 applies. If we
keep the same parameter values but increase max to 0.6, Conditions 1 and 2 still hold, but
Condition 3 does not, which means Proposition 2 applies.
Appendix C. Diversification
The main body of the paper has presented conditions in which increasing returns compel each
firm to stay permanently focused on a segment where it has early good fortune. On the other
hand, I have also showed that if the random shocks are large enough, or if firms are patient
enough, then it is always possible for firms to make major strategic changes, totally shifting
investment focus from one segment to another.
I now derive conditions in which each firm adopts an intermediate strategy, diversifying
investment into both segments simultaneously. For example, this could happen if: (1) the
firm reaches a point of decreasing returns in its core expertise, and returns in this segment
become low enough that investing in the other segment is more profitable; (2) assets in
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different segments are complementary, and the effect of this complementarity (which favors
diversification) outweighs the effect of increasing returns (which favors specialization); (3) the
firm wishes to deter competitive entry by making both segments unattractive to a potential
entrant; or (4) small exploratory investments in a segment lead to a small chance of a large
“breakthrough discovery.” For illustrative purposes, this section will focus on the last of these
reasons (possible breakthrough discoveries), but similar results could be shown for any of the
other three reasons for diversification.
Until now I have assumed that the distribution of random shocks does not depend on how
much a firm invests. To be more realistic, we might expect that in order to have a favorable
shock in a segment, a firm must make some positive investment there. In particular, assume
that the equations for how assets change over time, (3) and (4), are modified as follows:
Mi,t = γMi,t−1 +mi,t + β(mi,t) (C1)
Ni,t = γNi,t−1 + ni,t + β(ni,t) (C2)
The random variable β represents the results of a potential breakthrough discovery. As
an illustrative example, assume that the breakthrough term takes on values of either 0 or D
(where D > 0) and that:
P
[
β(m) = D
]
=
0 if m < b,p if m ≥ b (C3)
where the minimum investment threshold required to make a possible breakthrough in a
segment is denoted by b, and the probability of a breakthrough given that this threshold
is met is denoted by p ∈ (0, 1].
Proposition 5. Assume that investment of at least b units in a segment makes a “breakthrough
discovery” possible, so that assets change according to equations (C1), (C2), and (C3). If the
investment threshold (denoted by b) is sufficiently small, and firms are not too patient (δ is not
too large), in any equilibrium each firm always invests at least b units in each segment.
Proof: Suppose at time t Firm i sets its investment in at least one segment less than b. I
will show that, given the conditions of the proposition, the firm would be better off increasing
its investment in this segment to b. By increasing its investment in this segment to b, the firm
gains a probability p of having a favorable shock of size D in this segment. The possibility of
this “breakthrough discovery” increases the firm’s expected profits in the current period by at
least αp
[
F (D) − F (0) − ψDXH
]
. Recall we are assuming F ′(0) is sufficiently large that this
term is guaranteed to be positive.
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This additional investment must come at the expense either of increased total investment
or reduced investment in the other segment. Therefore, the cost of this shift in investment
is at most the maximum of Cb and
[
F (XH) − F (XH − b)
]
. Note these terms both approach
zero as b approaches zero, whereas the benefit of the possibly breakthrough discovery remains
positive and does not approach zero.
Next we must consider the impact on future profits of this shift in investment. Let ∆max
denote the largest possible change in Firm i’s value function that can result form a one-period
change in its investment. Note that because profits are bounded, this value has a finite upper
bound. The discounted value of this future impact is no greater than δ∆max, which approaches
zero as the discount factor δ approaches zero. Therefore, as long as b and δ are small enough,
the impact on its expected discounted profits when a firm puts at least b units of investment
into each segment must be positive, and so each firm always invests at least this amount in
each segment in equilibrium.
QED
This result is made possible because (C3) implies that the probability of a breakthrough
is a non-convex function of investment. In other words, Proposition 5 only applies if the
probability of a breakthrough generates decreasing returns to investment over a certain range
of investment levels, for example, if expected returns to investment are very high to the point
that the minimum threshold for a breakthrough is achieved, but then marginal returns become
lower for levels of investment in excess of this threshold.
Appendix D. Independent Investment Decisions
The version of the model in this appendix assumes that equilibrium profits have an additive
functional form, so that there are no interactions in competing firms’ investment decisions,
and each firm’s investments depend only on its own assets. Technically, I assume ψ = 0. We
could think of this version of the model as applying to a monopoly or to firms that are selling
very different products. This version of the model simplifies the analysis and helps convey
intuition for how the model works. It also illustrates that, even if firms do not explicitly care
about being different from each other, they can still become permanently focused on different
segments if they happen to experience different early shocks (although they could also end up
focusing in the same segment if they experience similar early shocks). By contrast, section
4 allows for interactions in firms’ investment decisions, and derives conditions that guarantee
firms become different.
Given ψ = 0, the two firms’ assets do not interact in the profit functions, so it is possible
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to formulate each firm’s maximization problem as an infinite period dynamic program.16 For
convenience of notation, the following expression suppresses the subscripts on the investment
variables, mi,t+1 and ni,t+1:
V (Mi,t, Ni,t) = F (Mi,t) + αF (Ni,t) + max
m,n:m≥0,n≥0,(m+n)≤1
δ
{
E[V (Mi,t+1, Ni,t+1)]− Cm− Cn
}
(D1)
The following proposition characterizes optimal investment behavior for each firm.
Proposition 6. If ψ = 0, then for any given state, the only possible optimal policies are to
invest nothing, to invest as much as possible in the mainstream segment, or to invest as much
as possible in the niche segment. If a firm invests in the mainstream segment when its assets
levels are (M,N), then it also invests in the mainstream segment for all states (MH , NL), where
MH ≥M and NL ≤ N . An analogous result holds for investment in the niche segment.
Proof: I will first show that the value function V (M,N) is jointly convex in its two
arguments. For any feasible asset values {M1, N1} and {M2, N2}, and any θ ∈ (0, 1), define
M3 ≡ θM1 + (1− θ)M2 and N3 ≡ θN1 + (1− θ)N2 . I will show that:
θV (M1, N1) + (1− θ)V (M2, N2) > V (M3, N3) (D2)
Define V̂ (M,N) as the expected discounted profits generated by starting at state {M,N}
but following the investment policy that would be optimal when starting at state {M3, N3}.
Because this policy may not be optimal when starting at state {M,N}, it must be true that
V (M,N) ≥ V̂ (M,N). Therefore, inequality (D2) is guaranteed to hold if:
θV̂ (M1, N1) + (1− θ)V̂ (M2, N2) > V (M3, N3) (D3)
The first term on the left side of this inequality represents θ times the expected discounted
profits for a firm that starts at state {M1, N1} and follows the policy that would be optimal
starting at state {M3, N3}. The second term on the left side represents (1−θ) times the profits
to a firm starting at state {M2, N2}, while the term on the right side represents the profits to
firm starting at state {M3, N3}, each following this same policy. Even though the same policy
is followed in all three cases, because firms start at different points they will always lead to
different asset levels. After t periods of following this policy, mainstream assets will be of the
16There could be other equilibria (supported by mutual punishment strategies) in which each firm bases its
investment decisions partly on the other’s assets, but for now I focus on the equilibrium in which they make
independent decisions. Also, to simplify notation, I have omitted from the value function the terms reflecting
firm j’s impact on firm i’s profits. In the equilibrium in which each firm’s investment depends only on its own
assets, this simplified value function leads to the same optimal policy as the original value function.
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form (γtM1 + x) for the first firm, (γ
tM2 + x) for the second firm, and (γ
tM3 + x) for the
third firm, where x represents the cumulative effect of each firm’s mainstream investments and
random shocks.
By the convexity of the profit function F , we know that:
θF (γtM1 + x) + (1− θ)F (γtM2 + x) > F (γtM3 + x) (D4)
Similar analysis holds for the niche segment. This implies that θ times the first firm’s profits
plus (1 − θ) times the second firm’s profits are always grater than the third firm’s profits. In
other words, inequality (D3) holds, which implies that (D2) holds.
I have established that each firm’s value function is strictly convex. Given that the set of
feasible actions is a convex set with linear constraints, this implies that only corner solutions
can be optimal. In other words, the only possible optimal policies are to invest as much as
possible in the mainstream segment, to invest as much as possible in the niche segment, or to
invest nothing.
It also immediately follows from the convexity of the value function that an increase in
mainstream assets makes investing in the mainstream segment more attractive, and an increase
in niche assets makes investing in the niche segment more attractive.
It still remains to be shown that an increase in niche assets cannot make investing in the
mainstream segment more attractive. Technically, I need to show that for any asset values
{M,N} and any x > 0:
V (M + 1, N)− V (M,N) ≥ V (M + 1, N + x)− V (M,N + x) (D5)
This is equivalent to:
V (M + 1, N) + V (M,N + x) ≥ V (M,N) + V (M + 1, N + x) (D6)
This inequality can be proven using a similar approach to the proof of convexity of the
value function shown above. In particular, define V˜ (M + 1, N) is the expected discounted
profits from starting at state {M + 1, N} and adopting the following policy. In each period,
compute the optimal policy for firms that started at sates {M,N} and {M + 1, N + x}, and
mimic whichever one invests more in the mainstream segment. Similarly, define V (M,N + x)
as the expected discounted profits from starting at state {M,N +x} and mimicking whichever
of the two firms invests more in the niche segment.
Inequality (D6) is guaranteed to hold as long as:
V˜ (M + 1, N) + V (M,N + x) ≥ V (M,N) + V (M + 1, N + x) (D7)
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The sum of the mainstream assets of the two firms on the left of this inequality is always
the same as the sum for the last two, but the variance is at least as great for the first two.
Therefore, the convexity of the value function guarantees that total mainstream profits for the
first two firms are weakly higher than for the last two. A similar argument holds for niche
assets. In other words, (D6) holds, which implies that an increase in niche assets cannot make
investing in the mainstream segment more attractive, and vice versa.
These result imply that, for a given value function V , it is possible to compute the optimal
policy function as follows. If firm i’s current asset levels are (M,N), compute the expected
return to investing one unit in the mainstream segment:
(
E[V (γM + 1 + m, γN + n)]− E[V (γM + m, γN + n)]
)
− C (D8)
Then compute the expected return of investing one unit in the niche segment.
(
E[V (γM + m, γN + 1 + n)]− E[V (γM + m, γN + n)]
)
− C (D9)
If both expressions are negative, do not invest in either segment. If at least one expression is
positive, invest one unit in the segment with the higher expected return and zero units in the
other segment.
Each firm can have multiple optimal strategies only if these two expressions are exactly
equal or if the larger of them exactly equals zero. Suppose assets are at a point where the two
expressions are equal. Because each firm’s value function is strictly convex, as shown above,
any positive perturbation of the firm’s assets in either segment implies that (D8) and (D9) are
no longer equal. Thus, the set of points at which a firm has more than one optimal strategy
has measure zero. Given that the error terms have no mass points, the probability of arriving
at such a point is zero, and with probability one each firm always has a pure strategy that is
its unique optimal strategy.
QED
I now show how the investment behavior described in this proposition determines the
evolution of a firm’s assets. In particular, the following numerical example illustrates how a
firm’s asset growth can exhibit “path dependence,” meaning that small random events have
large permanent consequences.
Figure D1 presents the optimal policy function for one particular numerical example.17
The x-axis gives the firm’s mainstream assets; the y-axis its niche assets. When a firm has low
assets in both segments, it makes no investment. In practical terms, the “do not invest” region
indicates that a firm should not enter the market unless it already has assets that provide a
small advantage in serving one segment. These assets might have been developed through the
17I calculate the optimal policy function over a 60x60 grid of values in Matlab, using modified policy iteration,
with ten value iterations for each policy iteration (see Bertsekas 2007, p. 43).
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firm’s activities in another market, or they might result from the founder’s prior experience or
useful discovery.
Once a firm builds up enough assets in a segment, it starts to focus all of its investment
in that segment. It then continues to focus in that same segment unless it has a large enough
positive shock in the other segment that it switches its investment focus. However, once a
firm begins investing in the niche segment (for example), the most likely outcome is that it
will move up the y-axis until it reaches the “niche recurrent class.” Once this occurs, the firm
always focuses its investment in the niche segment; its assets fluctuate along both dimensions
due to random chance, but never leave the recurrent class.
Note that each recurrent class is a perfect square. This is a result of the assumption of iid
error terms in each segment. For example, imagine a firm always invests as much as possible in
the niche segment. If it repeatedly receives the worst possible random shock in each segment,
its assets converge to the bottom-left corner of the niche recurrent class. However, if the
firm repeatedly receives the best possible random shock in the mainstream segment, given the
constant depreciation rate, the furthest it can move along the horizontal dimension is to the
right boundary of the niche recurrent class. Similarly, if it receives the best possible random
shock in the niche segment, the furthest it can move along the vertical dimension is to the top
of this recurrent class.
For this numerical example, a firm that starts with no assets could end up permanently
trapped in either recurrent class, depending on random changes early in the firm’s life. Thus,
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firms that are initially identical can become permanently different based on small differences
in the early random shocks they experience.
To summarize, this section has shown that permanent differences between firms can
arise even on dimensions for which firms do not explicitly care about being different from
competitors. Under increasing returns, each firm has an incentive to focus on the dimension
where it has the most early success, and so firms that are only slightly different might make
investments that take then in completely different directions. However, in this version of the
model firms could also end up focusing in the same segment if they experience similar early
shocks. By contrast, Section 4 in the main body of the paper derives conditions that guarantee
firms become permanently focused on different segments.
Example: Word-of-mouth effects for ice cream. I now present a simply theoretical
example illustrating one possible source of increasing returns, with independent investment
decisions. Assume two ice cream shops each sell smooth and chunky flavors. Each shop’s
mainstream assets represent its ability to create high quality smooth flavors, and niche assets
represent its ability to create high quality chunky flavors. The random shocks represent
fortunate discoveries of better recipes, such as Ben and Jerry’s discovering that people like large
chunks, and investments represent efforts to improve the production process for a particular
type of flavor.
It is convenient (but not essential for the intuition of this example to hold) to assume prices
for each shop and each flavor are fixed at the same level and have the same constant marginal
production cost, so profits are a linear function of demand at the fixed price level. In each
period, a group of customers of mass 1 who only eat smooth ice cream, and a group of mass
α who only eat chunky ice cream, each randomly choose a shop and try a sample of its ice
cream to determine its quality. Each customer then either makes a purchase from that shop or
makes no purchase at all. Of the customers who visit shop i, the probability of each smooth
flavor customer making a purchase is
Mi,t
Qmax
, and the probability of each chunky flavor customer
making a purchase is
Ni,t
Qmax
, where Qmax denotes maximum possible quality level. All customers
remain in the market for one period. At this point, a shop’s profits in each period are a linear
function of its quality in each segment, so there are constant returns to investment.
I now incorporate word-of-mouth effects into the model and show how this can generate
increasing returns. Assume each customer who makes a purchase leaves the shop with his ice
cream and, with probability w, meets a friend who asks where he purchased the ice cream
and how good it is. If the ice cream is a smooth flavor, this friend then visits the shop and
purchases ice cream with probability
Mi,t
Qmax
, and if the ice cream is a chunky flavor, the friend
visits the shop and purchases with probability
Ni,t
Qmax
. If customers’ friends do not overlap, so
no one hears about a product from two different sources, then demand does not depend on
the competitor’s quality, and shop i’s mainstream (smooth flavor) profits are proportional to
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Mi,t
Qmax
+w
(
Mi,t
Qmax
)2
, and niche (chunky flavor) profits are proportional to α
[
Ni,t
Qmax
+w
(
Ni,t
Qmax
)2]
.
Now there are increasing returns, and the example fits the assumptions of the model.
The intuition is that, when customers learn about products through word-of-mouth, im-
provements to product quality make more people aware that the product exists, in addition to
increasing the fraction of people who purchase it conditional on awareness. The multiplication
of these effects leads to increasing returns. This theoretical example bears resemblance to the
model by Rob and Fishman (2005), in which word-of-mouth effects also generate increasing
returns. One important difference is that in their model firms invest along a single dimension,
whereas in the current model firms invest along two dimensions, which can lead only slightly
different firms to focus entirely on different segments.
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